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Financial Relations between Banks and Firms:
New Evidence from Japanese Data
Abstract
This paper considers how firm-specific factors affected the financial rela-
tions between banks and firms in Japan during the period in which deregu-
lation and reform of the financing decisions of firms were almost completed.
This was also a period in which Japanese banks incurred large bad loans.
Our empirical results suggest that: (i) main banks make more short-term
loans to firms with smaller prospects for growth and a greater likelihood of
financial distress; (ii) main banks misuse their private information for their
self-interest at the expense of the other banks in bond underwriting, and (iii)
main banks hold a greater number of shares of firms with smaller prospects
for growth. These findings indicate that the role of main banks as a lender
to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of finan-
cial distress is constrained. To overcome this problem, the authorities may
be allowed to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks and attempt to
reorganize a new banking system that promotes lending to firms with greater
prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial distress.
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G24, G32




The purpose of this paper is to consider the effect on corporate governance
of a change in corporate financial policy, using Japanese market data for the
period in which deregulation and reform of the financing decisions of firms
were almost completed and Japanese banks incurred large bad loans. We
also discuss how financial relations between banks and firms in Japan should
be reorganized following the recent depression and financial crisis.
The Japanese banking system is often characterized as a main bank sys-
tem. A main bank is conventionally defined as a bank that holds the largest
single share, among the private financial institutions, of loans made to a firm.
The main bank usually owns some of the firm’s equities, and may even send
bank executives into top management positions within the firm. It is often
stated that most large Japanese firms have close financial, shareholding and
managerial ties with their main banks. However, the recent deregulation and
reform processes, combined with the large bad loan issues in the banking
sector, have changed this historical financing pattern of the Japanese firms.
When the deregulatory process began at the end of the 1970s, the restric-
tions on the public bond market in Japan were gradually relaxed and the
segmentation of the banking system began to decline. Although unsecured
straight and convertible bonds were permitted in the public bond market in
1979, the Bond Issue Criteria remained prohibitively stringent. Throughout
the 1980s and the early 1990s deregulation of the public bond market con-
tinued. However, until the beginning of 1993, the issue of corporate bonds
required commissioned or trustee bank-managed collateral of secured bonds.
Because the commissioned or trustee bank monitored the issuing firm, se-
cured bonds were essentially similar to bank loans. The rating criteria were
finally removed in 1996, and all the rules governing bond issuance were abol-
ished.
In relation to the segmentation of the banking system, the 1993 Financial
System Reform Act lowered the traditional barriers between banks and se-
curities firms, and enabled banks to enter the security business through their
subsidiaries. Although the range of security services of these subsidiaries re-
mained limited, in less than three years from their initial establishment the
bank-owned securities subsidiaries were able to become the leading under-
writers (see Hamao and Hoshi (2000)).
Despite the progress associated with such deregulation, Japanese banks
incurred huge bad loans after the burst of the bubble economy. Because of
3
a need to clean up their balance sheets, Japanese banks were required to
sell portions of the stocks of their customer firms for the purpose of cross-
shareholding. This tendency was strengthened by the need to stabilize the
price fluctuations of the banks’ assets, since the recent reform of the account-
ing system demands a more stringent standard for bank capital requirements.
The deregulation and associated reforms, in combination with the huge
bad loan issues in the Japanese banking system, have changed the historical
financing patterns of Japanese firms. The deregulation of the public bond
market has caused some bank customers to shift from bank borrowing to
public bond issuance. The declining segmentation of the banking system has
also enabled bank-owned securities subsidiaries to become major players in
the corporate bond market. Huge bad loans and the reform of the accounting
system have gradually weakened cross-shareholding between banks and firms.
Nevertheless, this pattern may not be uniform: it is possible that the change
in the historical financing patterns of Japanese firms is more drastic in some
types of firms, but only slight in other types of firms.
In this paper, using data for the 1998 fiscal year in which deregulation
and reform were almost completed and Japanese banks incurred huge bad
loans, we consider how firm-specific factors affected the change in the histor-
ical financing patterns of Japanese firms. More specifically, we exploit the
sample selection and double hurdle models that incorporate the truncated na-
ture of dependent variables, and investigate how firm-specific characteristics
determine financial relations between banks and firms in the following four
fields: bank versus bond financing; the role of main banks in bank loans;
the choice of underwriters; and cross-shareholdings. The corporate gover-
nance of Japanese firms strongly depends on these four financial factors.
Our research also discusses how the recent deregulation and reform process,
combined with the huge bad loan issues in the banking sector, changed the
conventional main bank system.
Our empirical analysis has two distinguishing features. The first concerns
our chosen sample period. If some stringent regulations remain, the firm’s
financial choice will reflect these regulations, and empirical analysis will be
more likely to capture inappropriate relations between firm characteristics
and financing decisions that are merely artifacts of the regulatory process.
However, since our sampling period is based upon a period in which bond
issuance criteria were drastically reduced, many Japanese firms were able to
choose freely between bank borrowing and corporate bond issuance in this
period. In particular, we can assume that secured bonds were not similar to
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bank loans in this period. Furthermore, bank-owned securities subsidiaries
becamemajor leading underwriters because the Financial SystemReformAct
was effective in this period. Finally, cross-shareholdings between banks and
firms were gradually weakened to clear the balance sheets of banks and fulfill
the criteria of the newly reformed accounting system. Our sampling period
is therefore highly suitable for the purpose of investigating the change in the
historical financing patterns of Japanese firms in response to deregulation
and the reform process.
The second characteristic of our analysis involves the estimation method.
The most straightforward estimation method for the financial relations prob-
lem between banks and firms under the main bank system is to estimate
the ratio of loans from the main bank to total loans, the probability of the
main bank-owned securities subsidiary (or other bank-owned securities sub-
sidiaries) underwriting bonds as a lead underwriter, and the shareholding
ratio of the main bank (or other financial intermediaries) by Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS).
However, there are several difficulties relating to the data, which have to
be handled with caution if we use the OLS approach. First, not all firms
receive loans from the main bank, and some firms receive no loans from any
banks. Thus, we must first consider whether firms choose to borrow from
banks or to issue bonds, and then discuss whether or not firms depend on
main bank loans. Second, not all firms issue straight bonds. In particular,
few of the firms with credit ratings lower than or equal to BBB issue straight
bonds. Furthermore, firms that issue straight bonds often use existing secu-
rity companies as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting instead of bank
subsidiaries. This suggests that we must first investigate whether firms issue
bonds, and then check whether firms use main bank (or other bank) sub-
sidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting. Finally, almost all
of the firms have shareholdings with the main bank or the other financial
intermediaries that lend to the firms.
These features lead us to exploit the sample selection model to overcome
the sample selection bias that may be caused in estimating the ratio of loans
from the main bank to total loans or the probability of the main bank sub-
sidiary (or other bank subsidiaries) underwriting bonds as a lead underwriter.
Furthermore, since firms with bank loans may not borrow from their main
banks, or firms with bond issues may not choose their main bank (or other
bank) subsidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting, it is more
appropriate for our purpose to exploit the double hurdle model. This model
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takes account of the conditional probability of these events more precisely
than the sample selection model. On the other hand, we can use the OLS
method to estimate the shareholding ratio of the main bank (or the other
financial intermediaries) because we need not consider the sample selection
bias in the estimation of cross-shareholdings.
Our principal empirical results are summarized as follows:
(i) In relation to bank versus bond financing, Japanese firms with a smaller
Tobin’s q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on
bank loans.
(ii) In relation to the role of main banks in bank loans, Japanese firms with
a smaller Tobin’s q and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly
more on short-term bank loans provided by main banks.
(iii) In relation to the firm’s choice of underwriters, Japanese firms with
higher interest coverage and higher debt-asset ratios are more likely to use
their main bank-owned securities subsidiaries than other bank-owned secu-
rities subsidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting.
(iv) In relation to cross-shareholdings, a smaller Tobin’s q indicates that
Japanese firms have significantly more shareholdings by main banks than by
the other financial intermediaries.
Results (i) and (ii) show that the banks lend more to firms with smaller
prospects for growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress. In partic-
ular, main banks lend more to these firms by short-term loans. This result
can be interpreted such that main banks are forced to make additional loans
in order to support financially distressed firms with lower growth potential.
Results (i) and (iii) suggest that firms with greater prospects for growth
and a smaller likelihood of financial distress tend to issue bonds. Further-
more, main bank subsidiaries are more likely to underwrite less financially
distressed firms than other bank subsidiaries. This result is consistent with
the conflict of interest effect hypothesis which states that main banks misuse
their private information for their self-interest at the expense of the other
banks. Result (iv) indicates that main banks hold more shares belonging
to firms with smaller prospects for growth. The greater shareholding by
main banks resolves the liquidity constraint problem of firms with smaller
prospects for growth, to which the main banks lend. Combined with result
(ii), this finding may support the liquidity constraint hypothesis that firms
belonging to declining industries or firms with smaller growth opportunities
are more likely to have close financial relationships with main banks in order
to avoid the liquidity problem.
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Results (ii) and (iii) indicate strongly that the lending behavior of the
main bank system is constrained because main banks are forced to make ad-
ditional loans to firms that have a smaller prospect of growth and a greater
likelihood of financial distress, whereas main banks misuse their private in-
formation for their self-interest at the expense of the other banks in bond
underwriting. Furthermore, result (iv) may imply a negative view of the main
bank system with respect to shareholdings. These findings suggest that most
of the major Japanese banks cannot decrease their bad loans by themselves.
To overcome this problem, the authorities may need to nationalize most of
the major Japanese banks and attempt to organize a new banking system
that promotes bank lending to firms with greater prospects for growth but a
greater likelihood of financial distress.1
Although there are many empirical studies in relation to our subject, as
reviewed in the following section, each of these studies is limited in that
they deal with only one of the four topics that we consider. Furthermore,
their estimation methods are not immune from the sample selection bias.
Thus, the most significant difference between those studies and ours is that
the former examine each individual topic separately without considering the
sample selection bias fully, whereas the latter explores the four topics in an
integrated manner using the sample selection or the double hurdle model
that incorporates the truncated nature of dependent variables. Furthermore,
in contrast to our study, the empirical studies of Japanese firms, with the
exception of only a few studies, do not use data from the period in which
radical deregulation and reforms occurred.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical hy-
potheses about the determinants of financial relations between banks and
firms, and summarizes the empirical literature that tests these hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the estimation method and presents the sample selection
and double hurdle models. Section 4 discusses data and estimation results.
The final section is devoted to the conclusion.
1Osano (2002) discusses a theoretical foundation for the nationalization of financially
distressed banks.
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2 Review of Theoretical Hypotheses and Em-
pirical Evidence
2.1 Bank versus bond financing
We begin by examining the theoretical hypotheses and the empirical evidence
with respect to a firm’s choice between bank and bond financing.
2.1.1 Theoretical hypotheses
Diamond (1991a) and Rajan (1992) indicate that the agency costs of debt
determine the mix of monitored bank debt and arm’s-length public debt.
Firms with high agency costs are more likely to depend on monitored bank
debt than arm’s-length public debt. Since monitoring creditors have access to
private information and can monitor investment decisions, they can efficiently
make the liquidation or refinancing decision in relation to their financially
distressed firms. As a result, monitored bank debt is more valuable to firms
with high agency costs, in particular, small firms or firms without established
reputations. Since firms with high agency costs are likely to be young and
highly technological, they are likely to have greater growth opportunities.
The agency cost hypothesis thus suggests a positive relation between growth
opportunities and bank debt.
In contrast to the agency cost hypothesis, the hold-up hypothesis em-
phasizes an additional cost of monitored bank debt (see Sharpe (1990) and
Rajan (1992)). Monitoring creditors have some monopolistic power at the re-
financing stage because borrowing from other creditors is more costly. Since
firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to improve their fu-
ture reputations and thus have a greater incentive to avoid the additional
cost at the refinancing stage, the hold-up cost hypothesis suggests a negative
relation between growth opportunities and bank debt.
The third theoretical hypothesis is the liquidity constraint hypothesis,
which is similar to that proposed by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990,
1991). In this view, firms that have close financial relationships with banks
can more effectively avoid problems associated with financial distress. The
reason is that those banks are well informed about the firms and their
prospects, and the free-rider problems of renegotiating financial claims at
times of financial distress are less prevalent. Thus, having a close financial
relationship with a bank relaxes liquidity constraints by lessening information
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and incentive problems. Since firms belonging to declining industries or firms
with smaller growth opportunities are more likely to be liquidity constrained,
they are more likely to prefer bank borrowing rather than bond financing in
order to avoid the liquidity problem. This hypothesis thus implies a negative
relation between growth opportunities and bank debt, as indicated by the
hold-up hypothesis.
Finally, whichever hypothesis holds true, we can see that lower-rated firms
find it more difficult to borrow arm’s-length public debt than monitored bank
debt. This argument leads us to state that there exists a negative relation
between credit quality and bank debt.
2.1.2 Empirical evidence
The outcome of the empirical studies of U.S. firms depends on the size of the
firms. For small U.S. firms, Peterson and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell
(1995) show that close banking ties reduce credit costs, thus supporting the
agency cost hypothesis. On the other hand, for large U.S. firms, Houston and
James (1996) suggest a negative relation between growth opportunities and
bank debt, thus supporting the hold-up hypothesis or the liquidity constraint
hypothesis.
Several researchers have undertaken empirical studies of data from large
Japanese firms, but their results are mixed. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
(1990, 1991) indicate that firms with strong bank ties tend to be less liq-
uidity constrained. This result provides support for the liquidity constraint
hypothesis. Using data from the late 1980s–before the deregulation of the
corporate bond market–Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1993) find no re-
lation between growth opportunities and bank debt. On the other hand,
Anderson and Makhija (1999) report a positive relation between growth op-
portunities and bank debt, which supports the agency cost hypothesis. In
contrast, using data from 1993-1997–after the deregulation of the corporate
bond market–Shirasu and Xu (2000) find a negative relation between growth
opportunities and bank debt, thus supporting the hold-up hypothesis or the
liquidity constraint hypothesis. In addition, they report a negative relation
between credit quality and bank debt.
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2.2 The role of the main banks in bank loans
Next we review the theoretical hypotheses and their empirical evidence with
regard to the role of the main banks in bank loans.
2.2.1 Theoretical hypotheses
The stylized view suggests that the main bank system plays two important
roles in the Japanese bank market. One role is the monitoring function of
the main bank (see Aoki (1994)). In addition to the fact that the main
bank typically holds the largest single share, among private financial institu-
tions, of loans to a firm, it usually owns some of the firm’s equities and may
even send bank executives into top management positions within the firm.
Furthermore, the main bank normally holds the major payment settlement
accounts of the customer firm and can monitor its daily transactional opera-
tions. These instruments enable the main bank to monitor its customer firm
intensively, both on its own behalf and for the sake of other lenders. This also
serves to avoid costly duplication of monitoring costs. Since the main bank’s
monitoring is more likely to be required by firms with high agency costs, the
implication of the main bank’s monitoring role is equivalent to that of the
agency cost hypothesis discussed in the preceding section; that is, it suggests
a positive relation between growth opportunities and main bank debt.
The other important role of the main bank system depends on the risk-
shifting mechanism by which the main bank reduces deadweight losses asso-
ciated with corporate bankruptcy and reorganization. The key component of
the risk-shifting mechanism from a firm to its main bank is summarized as
follows. The firm pays “insurance premiums” to the main bank in normal
times, whereas the main bank gives “financial support” in times of financial
distress even though this means incurring additional losses. The “insurance
premiums” paid to the main bank in normal times do not necessarily imply
a higher nominal interest rate on loans. These premiums can be paid as a
higher effective interest rate through maintaining balances or as a higher and
more stable level of borrowing. The main bank can also be compensated for
the premiums by preferential treatment that designates the main bank as a
place of settlement of bills of payment issued by the firm, or allows the main
bank to make loans to affiliates and for consumer-related sales of the firm.
In return for these “insurance premiums”, the main bank will absorb a share
of any losses that is much greater than its loan share at default by granting
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interest or principal concessions on bank borrowings for a specified period.
The main bank bears a greater share of the burden of the default of the
firm than the other banks and financial institutions. The rationale for such
a risk-shifting mechanism is given by Sheard (1994) and Osano (1998). The
implication of the risk-shifting mechanism of the main bank is equivalent to
that of the liquidity constraint hypothesis examined in the preceding section.
That is, this view suggests a negative relation between growth opportunities
and main bank debt. Furthermore, since firms belonging to declining indus-
tries are given lower credit ratings, this view also implies a negative relation
between credit quality and main bank debt.
2.2.2 Empirical evidence
Several empirical studies attempt to examine the ex post monitoring role of
the main bank. Using data from the early 1980s, Prowse (1990) suggests
that the main bank relationship does not cause risky, sub-optimal invest-
ments. Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995), using
data from the 1980s, also give evidence that main banks play an important
monitoring and disciplinary role through the appointment of outside direc-
tors or the top executive turnover. On the other hand, Morck and Nakamura
(1999) indicate that during the 1980s the group firms of main banks did not
undergo sharp downsizing following bank appointments to their boards. The
risk-shifting role of the main bank is also investigated by Nakatani (1984),
Suzuki and Wright (1985), Sheard (1986, 1991), and Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1990). These studies provide empirical evidence for the risk-
shifting hypothesis.
2.3 The choice of underwriters
We now proceed to discuss the theoretical hypotheses and their empirical
evidence with respect to a firm’s choice of underwriters. We also reinterpret
these hypotheses as those that express the relation between credit quality
and main bank subsidiary underwriting.
2.3.1 Theoretical hypotheses
A conventional argument suggests that the underwriting of commercial banks
has a stronger certification effect than that of investment banks or security
11
companies (see Puri (1996, 1999)). This view stresses that commercial banks
can obtain private information about their customer firms through their loan
monitoring activities, whereas investment banks cannot. If the underwriting
of commercial banks produces more accurate and credible information, firms
with less established reputations prefer the underwriting of commercial banks
to that of investment banks. Since firms with less established reputations are
more likely to have a lower credit rating, they are more likely to prefer the
underwriting of commercial banks to that of investment banks. Thus, the
certification effect implies a negative relation between the credit rating grade
and commercial bank underwriting.
However, the certification effect is offset by the conflict of interest effect
(see Puri (1996, 1999)). If commercial banks misuse their private information
for their own self-interest, they could systematically underwrite securities is-
sued by firms to which they have outstanding bad loans, and use the proceeds
from the issued securities to make the firms repay these loans. If this is the
case, lower credit-rated firms are more likely to prefer the underwriting of
investment banks to that of commercial banks because the securities of such
firms underwritten by commercial banks will be more discounted than those
by investment banks. Thus, the conflict of interest effect suggests a positive
relation between credit quality and commercial bank underwriting.
The third theoretical hypothesis with respect to the choice of underwriters
is the liquidity constraint hypothesis. In this hypothesis, firms that have
close financial relationships with commercial banks can more effectively avoid
problems associated with financial distress. If firms desire to build close
financial relationships with commercial banks, they are more likely to prefer
the underwriting of commercial banks. Since firms belonging to declining
industries or firms with smaller growth opportunities are more likely to be
liquidity constrained, these firms are more likely to prefer commercial bank
underwriting to investment bank underwriting. Given that firms belonging
to declining industries have smaller growth opportunities and lower credit
ratings, this hypothesis implies not only a negative relation between growth
opportunities and commercial bank underwriting, but also a negative relation
between credit quality and commercial bank underwriting.
Indeed, although these three hypotheses are concerned with the relation
between credit quality and commercial bank underwriting, we can easily
reinterpret them so that they explain the relation between credit quality
and main bank subsidiary underwriting. In the next sections, we will apply




Examining underwritten security prices or the long-run performance of un-
derwritten securities on U.S. firms, Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and
Rajan (1994), and Puri (1994, 1996) give evidence for the certification effect
in the era prior to the Glass-Steagall Act. Gande, Puri, Saunders, andWalter
(1997) obtain similar results for the period after 1990 in bank underwritings
through Section 20 subsidiaries. Furthermore, Puri (1996) and Gande, Puri,
and Saunders (1999) report the result of the probit test in which commercial
bank underwriting varies inversely with credit quality. These results support
the certification effect on U.S. data.
Using Japanese data for the period after the deregulation of the corporate
bond market (1994-1996), Hamao and Hoshi (2000) compare the character-
istics of straight corporate bonds underwritten by existing securities firms
with those by bank subsidiary securities firms, and investigate what factors
affect the identity of the lead underwriter. Their results show that no signifi-
cant differences exist between the characteristics of straight corporate bonds
underwritten by existing securities firms and those underwritten by bank
subsidiary securities firms.
2.4 Cross-shareholdings
We finally investigate theoretical hypotheses and their empirical evidence
with respect to shareholdings by banks.
2.4.1 Theoretical hypotheses
Conventionally, cross-shareholdings are explained by the motive of preventing
a potential raider frommaking a hostile takeover bid (see Aoki (1988), Sheard
(1991), and Osano (1996)).
In contrast to this conventional view, Flath (1993) presents an agency
cost hypothesis with respect to shareholdings. In this view, by holding a
part of the shares of the firm, the main bank has access to privileged or
inside information on the firm’s creditworthiness and can reduce the pos-
sibility of the manager wastefully transferring wealth from debtholders to
some stockholders. Stockholdings by lenders to a firm can also forestall the
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asset substitution problem (as emphasized by Prowse (1990)), which states
that borrowing biases the investment decisions of the firm towards projects
that enrich shareholders at the expense of debtholders. Hence, the largest
debtholder or the main bank of a firm is more likely to hold a large part
of the stocks of the firm as it becomes more difficult to obtain information
about the firm’s credit quality or if asset substitution is more likely to arise.
Since these problems are more severe in firms with greater growth opportu-
nities, the agency cost hypothesis particularly suggests a positive correlation
between growth opportunities and the main bank’s shareholdings.2
The second theoretical hypothesis with respect to stockholdings by banks
is the liquidity constraint hypothesis, which implies that firms having close
financial relationships with banks can more effectively avoid problems asso-
ciated with financial distress. If firms desire to build close financial relation-
ships with banks, they are more likely to have their main banks hold their
stocks. Since firms belonging to declining industries or firms with smaller
growth opportunities are more likely to be liquidity constrained, they are
more likely to prefer the main bank’s shareholdings. Given that firms be-
longing to declining industries have smaller growth opportunities and lower
credit ratings, this hypothesis suggests not only a negative relation between
growth opportunities and the main bank’s shareholdings, but also a negative
relation between credit quality and the main bank’s shareholdings.
2.4.2 Empirical evidence
There are very few empirical studies on this issue. The exception is Flath
(1993), who estimates a pair of simultaneous equations using data from 1980,
with one equation explaining each firm’s debt-to-equity ratio and the other
explaining shareholdings in each firm by the firm’s largest debtholder (the
main bank). His results provide evidence that main banks in keiretsu presi-
dent’s council firms hold more stocks of the firms if the firms borrow heavily
or have a greater prospect of growth, and that keiretsu president’s council
firms in which debtholders hold more stocks borrow more.3 These results
2Flath (1993) also indicates that factors that exacerbate the agency problem of borrow-
ing will inhibit borrowing. To identify the structural interaction between debt to equity
ratios and shareholdings by the main bank, he estimates a simultaneous equation system
explaining these two variables.
3In 1980, the keiretsu were six groups that were comprised of most of the largest
corporations in Japan including the largest commercial banks.
14
support the agency cost hypothesis about the main bank’s stockholding.
3 Empirical Methods
3.1 Testable implications
Our concerns about the relations between banks and firms in Japan can be
reduced to two issues: first, how financial relations between banks and firms
in Japan have changed after the recent depression and financial crisis; and
second, whether main banks can play their specific role in the corporate finan-
cial policy of firms among financial intermediaries that hold some business
relations with the firms.
It is frequently stated that the recent changes in the Japanese financial
system have affected the strength of ties between non-financial firms and their
main banks. Nevertheless, even though firms can gain access to the public
bond market, there is a possibility that the ability of the main bank-owned
securities subsidiaries to underwrite bond issues may leave the strength of
the ties unchanged. On the other hand, the possibility also exists that only
the main bank system will disappear while the banking system as a whole
will maintain its traditional role in the capital market. In fact, we consider
that both the roles of the main bank system and the banking system as a
whole may be changed.
In the subsequent estimations, we make the following assumptions in re-
lation to how the managers of each firm make decisions about how to raise
funds. First, the managers determine the methods for raising funds, that
is, whether to borrow from banks, whether to issue bonds, and whether
to issue equities. Next, they choose which financial institutions they will
have dealings with. Japanese banks are not merely providers of loan capi-
tal, but also are often underwriters of bonds and major shareholders. Since
main banks are conventionally the most important financial institutions to
Japanese firms, these decisions primarily involve whether to continue each
of the business relationships with the main bank; that is, whether to borrow
from the main bank, whether to choose the main bank-owned securities sub-
sidiary as a lead underwriter, and whether to keep cross-shareholdings with
the main bank.
Our testable implications are derived from the theoretical hypotheses re-
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viewed in section 2.4 The hypotheses about bank versus bond financing are
examined by estimating two kinds of regressions as follows: (i) the dummy
variable indicating whether to borrow from banks is regressed on the indexes
of the firm’s growth prospects and the firm’s likelihood of financial distress,
and (ii) the dummy variable indicating whether to issue bonds is regressed
on the indexes of the firm’s growth prospects and the firm’s likelihood of
financial distress. We expect a positive relation between the firm’s growth
prospects and the firm’s choice of bank loans if the agency cost hypothe-
sis holds. In contrast, we anticipate a negative relation between the firm’s
growth prospects and the firm’s choice of bank loans if the hold-up or the
liquidity constraint hypothesis holds. For all three hypotheses, we also ex-
pect a positive relation between the firm’s likelihood of financial distress and
the firm’s choice of bank loans.
If the firm borrows from banks, then we discuss the hypotheses about the
role of main banks in bank loans. These hypotheses are tested by regressions
in which the main bank loan ratio is regressed on the indexes of the firm’s
growth prospects and the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. If the agency
cost hypothesis is supported, the expected result is a positive relation between
the firm’s growth prospect and the main bank loan ratio. On the other hand,
if the liquidity constraint hypothesis holds, the expected result is a negative
relation between the firm’s growth prospects and the main bank loan ratio,
but a positive relation between the firm’s likelihood of financial distress and
the main bank loan ratio.
If the firm issues bonds, then we investigate the hypotheses about the
firm’s choice of underwriters by regressions. The probability of the main
bank-owned securities subsidiary being a lead underwriter for the issue of the
firm’s straight bond is regressed on the indexes of the firm’s growth prospects
and the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. If the conflict of interest effect
is stronger than the certification effect, the estimated coefficient of the firm’s
likelihood of financial distress is expected to be negative. If the liquidity
constraint hypothesis holds, the estimated coefficient of the firm’s growth
prospect (the firm’s likelihood of financial distress) is expected to be negative
(positive). We also estimate the probability of other bank-owned securities
subsidiaries being a lead underwriter. We then compare these two regression
results and examine the implications in regard to the role of the main bank
in the public bond market.
4Since our sample firms are listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, they all issue equities.
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Finally, we test the hypotheses about shareholdings by regressions. The
stockholding ratio of the main bank is regressed on the indexes of the firm’s
growth prospects and the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. If the agency
cost hypothesis holds, the estimated coefficient of the firm’s growth prospect
is expected to be positive. In contrast, if the liquidity constraint hypothe-
sis holds, the estimated coefficient of the firm’s growth prospect (the firm’s
likelihood of financial distress) is expected to be negative (positive). As in
the case of the firm’s choice of underwriters, we estimate regressions for the
stockholding ratio of the other financial intermediaries in addition to those
of the main bank.
3.2 Data
To investigate the testable implications, we use data on Japanese manufac-
turing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange first and second sections
in fiscal year 1998. We work with five databases obtained from the Nikkei
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS) financial data, the Develop-
ment Bank of Japan (DBJ) financial data, the Quarterly Corporate Report
(Toyo Keizai Shimposha), the Nikkei Amsus Data Base, and the analysis
of financial statements of all banks (Federation of Bankers’ Associations of
Japan). The number of firms chosen as a sample is 848.
The dependent variables in our estimation models are as follows.
<Bank versus bond financing>
• Bank loan dummy variable, assigned the value one if the firm newly
borrows long-term loans from banks, and otherwise assigned the value
zero, in fiscal year 1998.
• Bond dummy variable, assigned the value one if the firm issues a straight
bond, and otherwise assigned the value zero, in fiscal year 1998.
<The role of the main banks in bank loans>
• Main bank loan ratio (MAINLOAN) ≡ Amount of loans from the main
bank / Total amount of loans from financial institutions
<The firm’s choice of underwriters>
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• Probability of the main bank-owned securities subsidiary being a lead
underwriter for the issue of straight bonds (MAINBOND) ≡ Frequency
that the main bank-owned securities subsidiary becomes a lead under-
writer in fiscal year 1998 / Frequency of the issue of straight bonds in
fiscal year 1998.
• Probability of other bank-owned securities subsidiaries being a lead un-
derwriter for the issue of straight bonds (OTHERBOND) ≡ Frequency
that other bank-owned securities subsidiaries become a lead under-
writer in fiscal year 1998 / Frequency of the issue of straight bonds in
fiscal year 1998.
<Shareholdings>
• Stockholding ratio by the main bank (MAINSTOCK) ≡ (Number of
stocks that the main bank holds / Total number of stocks) ∗ 20.
• Stockholding ratio by the other financial intermediaries except for the
main bank (FINSTOCK) ≡ Number of stocks that other financial in-
termediaries (excluding the main bank) hold / Total number of stocks.
We calculate MAINLOAN for each of the short-term and long-term loans.
To specify the main bank of each firm, we select the bank that is listed
first on the Quarterly Corporate Report among the banks holding business
relationships with the firm. We thus assume that every firm has a main bank
relationship with a bank.
We use only the data on domestic straight bonds because underwriters of
other bonds cannot be identified in our data set. The frequency of the issue
of straight bonds in fiscal year 1998 and underwriters for the bonds are also
obtained from our data set. All the data on the bond issue are taken from
the Nikkei Amsus Data Base.
The main independent variables are the index of the firm’s growth po-
tential and the index of the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. A simple
Tobin’s q (market-to-book ratio) is used as a proxy for the index of the firm’s
growth potential.5 We use the long-term bond-rating indexes (BONDRATE)
evaluated by rating agencies or the interest coverage ratio (ICR) as a proxy
5In this paper, the sum of the aggregate market values of stocks and interest-bearing
debts is defined as the market value of the firm. The amount of total assets is used as a
proxy for the book value.
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for the index of the firm’s likelihood of financial distress.6 The one-period
lagged values are also employed to avoid a simultaneity bias.
However, there are some problems in using BONDRATE as a proxy for
the index of the firm’s likelihood of financial distress. The reason is that
only about 900 firms are evaluated by at least one of the rating agencies,
and the number of these firms is rather less than that of all firms listed on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange first and second sections. Thus, BONDRATE is
not suitable to examine the solvency of all our sample firms. Instead, we
use mainly ICR rather than BONDRATE as a proxy that shows the firm’s
likelihood of financial distress.7
The additional explanatory variables are the firm size (SIZE), the debt-
asset ratio (DEBT), the main bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR), the non-
commercial bank dummy variable, the trust bank dummy variable, and the
industrial dummy variables.
We measure SIZE as the natural logarithm of sales. As Anderson and
Makhija (1999) point out, the firm size could be a proxy that captures several
aspects of the investment opportunity set for Japanese firms. First, large
firms tend to have established reputations, and can thus make more firm-
specific information publicly available than small firms. Second, large firms
tend to have more diversified portfolios of investment opportunities, and their
portfolios could be less risky than those of small firms. Third, large firms
are more likely to enjoy benefits from economies of scale when issuing bonds,
since the large size of their bond issues makes average underwriting costs
lower. Finally, large firms tend to borrow funds from several banks through
6The long-term bond-rating indexes are dummy variables in our estimation. In Japan,
four bond rating agencies–Rating and Information (R&I), Japan Credit Rating agency
(JCR), Standard and Poors (S&P), and Moody’s Japan–provide long-term bond ratings.
Japanese firms are usually given long-term bond ratings by more than two agencies. When
different agencies provide different ratings, we use the highest rating as BONDRATE.
7In this paper, we define the interest coverage ratio for the i-th firm (ICRi) by
1
1+exp(−(Ai/Bi)) , where Ai is the business profit equal to the sum of the operating in-
come, the amortization of consolidation difference in general administration expenses, and
the interest and dividends received; and Bi is the interest paid, including amortization of
bond premiums. The interest coverage ratio is usually defined as (business profit)/(interest
paid including amortization of bond premiums). However, since the denominator can be
zero if the usual definition of the interest coverage ratio is used, we cannot calculate the
interest coverage ratio of firms if they do not raise their funds by debt. In contrast, using
our definition of the interest coverage ratio, we can define the ICRi of such a non-debt
firm as one. Thus, our ICRi is distributed on the [0, 1] interval.
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syndicated loans because they enjoy lower average monitoring costs as well
as underwriting costs.
The variable DEBT is defined as the total amount of debt divided by
the total amount of assets. This ratio may also be interpreted as an addi-
tional proxy for the index of the firm’s likelihood of financial distress: firms
with larger DEBT are supposed to be more likely to default. Furthermore,
DEBT also indicates potential cost caused by renegotiation among creditors
and debtors if a firm is financially distressed. Thus, firms with larger DEBT
are expected to incur higher renegotiation costs. As shown in Rajan (1992),
banks can reorganize financially distressed firms more efficiently than can
arm’s length investors. This would be particularly true in Japan: since the
main bank makes an implicit promise to accept disproportionate shares of
write-offs, it is thought that the main bank plays an active role in reorgani-
zation. Thus, firms with larger DEBT are more likely to rely on their main
banks as a provider of funds because they expect that their main banks can
reduce the potential cost due to renegotiation.
The variable CAR captures possible effects of the solvency status of the
main bank on the corporate financial policy. First, this variable reflects
the bank’s capability to lend to non-financial firms. Thus, we expect that
larger MAINLOAN is associated with larger CAR. Second, CAR can also be
interpreted as a proxy that expresses the degree of the risk management of
the firm’s main bank. If the firm’s main bank makes bad loans because it
lacks the ability to manage risk, then the capital adequacy ratio of the firm’s
main bank is low. In this view, if larger MAINLOAN is associated with
smaller CAR, this can be interpreted as describing a main bank that fails in
the liquidation of inefficient firms and makes many bad loans to inefficient
firms.
If the main bank is a government financial institution such as the Devel-
opment Bank of Japan, the noncommercial bank dummy variable is assigned
the value one; otherwise, it is assigned the value zero. The trust bank dummy
variable is equal to one if the main bank is a trust bank, and is equal to
zero otherwise. The reason for adding the trust bank dummy variable to the
explanatory variables is that the stockholdings by trust banks include trust
assets such as the investment trust. A set of the industrial dummy variables
is classified by industry midrange categories. The descriptive statistics of the
variables we use are summarized in Table 1 except for the dummy variables.
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3.3 Econometric methods
3.3.1 Potential possibilities of the sample selection bias
The simplest way of dealing with our empirical study is to estimate three
kinds of OLS regressions where the dependent variables are the main bank
loan ratios, the probabilities of main bank-owned or other bank-owned se-
curities subsidiaries being a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds,
and the shareholding ratios by the main bank or the other financial inter-
mediaries. We then evaluate the estimation results and determine which
hypothesis is consistent with the sign of the estimated coefficients of the
independent variables. However, we need to consider the features of the
Japanese corporate loan market before we begin the estimation procedure.
First, it should be noted that not all the firms borrow from their main
banks. Among the firms included in our sample, 234 firms do not incur
any short-term debts to their main banks, and 334 firms do not incur any
long-term debts to their main banks. Furthermore, 198 firms do not incur
short-term debts to any banks, and 212 firms do not incur long-term debts
to any banks. Hence, we need to examine whether the firm selects a bank
loan as a method of raising funds, and then discuss whether the firm borrows
from its main bank if the firm chooses the bank loan to raise funds. If we
do not consider this point, the estimation results may contain the sample
selection bias.
Second, firms that issue straight bonds are still not a large proportion of
the firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange even though regulation of the
straight bond issue has been eased. In addition, we should note that few firms
with a credit rating below BBB issue straight bonds. In our sample set, only
92 firms actually issued straight bonds in fiscal year 1998. Furthermore, in
many cases bank-owned securities subsidiaries do not underwrite the straight
bond issue at all, while existing securities companies underwrite it. Thus,
to avoid the sample selection bias, we need to investigate whether the firm
selects the issue of straight bonds as a method of raising funds, and then if
it does so, discuss whether the firm makes the main bank-owned securities
subsidiary underwrite the newly issued bond.
Third, although the sample selection problems are caused when the firm
borrows from banks or chooses bank-owned securities subsidiaries as an un-
derwriter of the bond issue, these problems do not occur for cross-shareholdings.
Since all the firms included in our sample set are companies listed on the
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Tokyo Stock Exchange, they raise funds by issuing equities. Thus, we need
not consider whether the sample firm chooses the issue of stocks as a method
of raising funds.8 The remaining concern is whether banks really hold shares
issued by the sample firms. In fact, in most of our sample firms, not only do
their main banks hold a part of their shares, so also do other financial inter-
mediaries that lend them funds. Thus, we can ignore the sample selection
problem when we estimate the shareholding ratio.
Finally, in the subsequent analysis, we examine only the holding ratios of
non-financial firms’ shares held by main banks and the other financial inter-
mediaries. We do not discuss the holding ratios of financial intermediaries’
shares held by non-financial firms because we could not obtain the relevant
data.
The above arguments suggest that if we use only firms that borrow from
banks or issue straight bonds as our sample set, our estimation results are
not immune from the sample selection bias. Thus, we use the sample selec-
tion model to incorporate the truncated nature of the dependent variables–
MAINLOAN, MAINBOND and OTHERBOND–in the subsequent discus-
sion. Furthermore, since there are firms that do not borrow from their main
banks but take out loans from the other financial intermediaries (MAIN-
LOAN = 0) or firms which do not choose the main bank-owned securities
subsidiary or other bank-owned securities subsidiaries as a lead underwriter
but issue straight bonds (MAINBOND = 0 or OTHERBOND = 0),9 it is
more desirable to use the double hurdle model.
3.3.2 The sample selection model
The sample selection model has the following form
y∗i = x
0
iβ + ui, i = 1, · · · , N, (1)
I∗i = z
0
iγ + vi, i = 1, · · · , N, (2)
where y∗i and I
∗
i are latent variables, xi and zi are the vectors of explanatory
variables, β and γ are unknown parameter vectors to be estimated, and ui
8This does not exclude the possibility of the sample selection bias occurring as a result of
the fact that we only chose firms which raise funds through the issue of equities. However,
we cannot consider the bias problem because we do not have data on unlisted firms.
9For firms that choose existing securities companies as a lead underwriter, note that
MAINBOND = 0 and OTHERBOND = 0.
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where ρ is a correlation coefficient between ui and vi, and var (ui) ≡ σ2. Note
that we can set var (vi) ≡ σ2v = 1 without any loss of generality. Equation
(1) is the regression in which we are primarily interested. Equation (2) is the
sample selection that represents the firm’s choice of whether to borrow from
banks or issue straight bonds.
However, we cannot observe y∗i or I
∗
i directly because they are assumed to




i · 1 {I∗i > 0} , (3)
where 1 {I∗i > 0} ≡ Ii takes one if I∗i > 0, and takes zero otherwise. In our
model, yi is the main bank loan ratio or the probability of the main bank-
owned (other bank-owned) securities subsidiary (subsidiaries) being a lead
underwriter.
The likelihood function for the sample selection model is then
L = Π
yi=0
Pr (Ii = 0 | zi) · Π
yi>0
f (yi | xi, zi, Ii = 1) , (4)
where f is the density function of yi.
To begin with, we consider the probability of a censored observation,
Pr (Ii = 0 | zi). The probability based on the observability criteria of (3) is
Pr (Ii = 0 | zi) = Pr (vi < −z0iγ) = 1− Φ (z0iγ) , (5)
where Φ is the standard bivariate normal probability distribution function.
For an uncensored observation, we can decompose f (yi | xi, zi, Ii = 1)
into a product of the conditional probability of I∗i and the unconditional
density for yi:
f (yi | xi, zi, Ii = 1) = Pr (I∗i > 0 | yi) · f (yi) . (6)
Since ui and vi are assumed to have the bivariate normal distribution, we
can derive the conditional probability of I∗i > 0 for given yi:
Pr (I∗i > 0 | yi) = Pr (vi > −z0iγ | ui) = Φ
Ã

























where φ is the standard bivariate normal density function. Applying the
maximum likelihood (ML) method to this likelihood function, we can obtain
the estimates of the parameter vectors bβ and bγ.
3.3.3 The double hurdle model
The double hurdle model proposed by Cragg (1971) is an alternative to the
sample selection model. The double hurdle model modifies the sample selec-
tion model by supposing that yi is censored at 0. Thus, we can interpret the
double hurdle model as a tobit model with sample selection. Formally, the
double hurdle model is represented by the same form as the sample selection




i · 1 {y∗i > 0 and I∗i > 0} ,
where 1 {y∗i > 0 and I∗i > 0} takes one if y∗i > 0 and I∗i > 0, and takes zero
otherwise.
Using this observability criteria, the probability of an uncensored obser-
vation is defined by
Pr (yi > 0 | xi, zi) = Pr (y∗i > 0 and I∗i > 0)








Hence, the conditional probability of yi > 0 for given xi and zi is defined in
a similar way to that of the sample selection model, (7).








. This probability is decomposed into the following two
parts:
Pr (yi = 0 | xi, zi) = Pr (Ii = 0 | zi) + Pr (yi = 0 and Ii = 1 | xi, zi) . (8)
The first part of the right-hand side of (8) is identical to equation (5). Jones
(1992) points out difficulties in expressing the second part of the right-hand
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likelihood function because the form of the likelihood function is complex (Φ2
is also the standard bivariate normal probability distribution function). How-
ever, he shows how the double hurdle model can be applied to econometric
software packages such as GAUSS and LIMDEP. Greene (1998) also provides
the code for the double hurdle model in LIMDEP. We utilize this code in the
subsequent estimation.





























The details of the derivation of this likelihood function are given by Jones
(1992). We obtain the estimates of the parameter vectors by applying the
ML method. To sum up, the double hurdle model is more suitable than the
sample selection model for a data set that includes many samples y∗i = 0
although I∗i > 0.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Bank versus bond financing
Before exploring the ties between firms and their main banks, we investigate
which firms borrow from banks and which firms issue straight bonds. To this








2 + ε2i .
Here, the variable I1i takes a value of one if the firm newly borrows long-term
loans from banks, and takes zero otherwise, in fiscal year 1998. The variable
I2i equals one if the firm issues straight bonds, and takes zero otherwise, in
fiscal year 1998. The elements of the vector zi consist of one, Tobin’s q,




















We need to use the bivariate probit model in order to consider the hy-
potheses about bank versus bond financing. We obtain consistent estimators
of the equations of the bivariate probit model even though we estimate only
one of these equations (as shown in the following subsections 4.2 and 4.3).
However, this procedure is inefficient because the correlation between the
disturbances ε1i and ε
2
i– represented by ρε– is ignored.
Table 2 reports the estimated results. These results suggest that the at-
tributes of firms that choose loans from banks can be clearly distinguished
from those of firms which choose the issue of bonds: firms with larger
(smaller) Tobin’s q and ICR tend to issue bonds (borrow from banks). These
findings support the hold-up and liquidity constraint hypotheses.
4.2 Main bank loans
In this subsection, we consider the sample selection and double hurdle models
represented by (1) and (2). Here, yi is themain bank loan ratio(MAINLOAN);
and Ii is assigned a value of one if the firm borrows from banks, and is as-
signed zero otherwise. The elements of the vector xi in (1) consist of one,
Tobin’s q, ICR, SIZE, DEBT, CAR, and the noncommercial bank dummy
variable. The vector zi in (2) is made up of one, Tobin’s q, ICR, and the
trust bank dummy variable.
We examine MAINLOAN by distinguishing between short-term and long-
term loans. The estimation results for the short-term loans are reported in
Table 3. Both the coefficients of Tobin’s q and ICR in the sample selection
are significantly negative, as shown in the top half of Table 3. These results
imply that firms with a lower prospect of growth and a greater likelihood of
financial distress are more likely to choose bank loans for their short-term
debt, which is consistent with the results obtained in the bivariate probit
model in Table 2.
For the results of the regression indicated in the bottom half of Table 3,
both the coefficients of Tobin’s q and ICR are significantly negative. Thus,
firms that choose bank loans for their short-term debt are more likely to
depend on their main banks if their growth opportunities are lower and their
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likelihood of financial distress is greater. This result is consistent with the
liquidity constraint hypothesis of the main bank. Our findings also suggest
that smaller sized firms have a closer relation with their main banks because
all the estimates of the coefficient of SIZE are significantly negative, which
agrees with our conjecture that larger firms tend to borrow in the form of
a syndicated loan. However, both the coefficients of DEBT and CAR are
significantly negative. These results are quite surprising because we expected
firms with larger DEBT to be more likely to depend on their main banks,
and main banks with larger CAR to be more likely to lend aggressively.
The reason for the unexpected results will be discussed in subsection 4.5.
For short-term bank loans, we do not find any clear differences between the
results based on the sample selection and double hurdle models.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the long-term bank loan. Both
the coefficients of Tobin’s q and ICR in the sample selection are significantly
negative. As verified in the case of short-term loans, these results suggest
that firms with a lower prospect of growth and a greater likelihood of financial
distress use more bank loans to finance their long-term debt.
In the regression, our estimation results based on the sample selection
model differ from those based on the double hurdle model as follows: (i) the
estimated coefficients of Tobin’s q and ICR are significantly negative in the
former model, whereas these coefficients are insignificant in the latter model;
and (ii) the other estimated coefficients fail to obtain unambiguous results in
the former model, while the estimated coefficients of SIZE, DEBT and CAR
are clearly significant in the latter model. The reason why the results depend
on the estimation models is due to the fact that there are many firms that
choose bank loans to finance their long-term debt but do not take out long-
term loans from their main banks.10 From the results based on the double
hurdle model, the coefficient of SIZE is negative, whereas those of DEBT
and CAR are positive. These results are consistent with our conjecture.
We focus on the results of the double hurdle model and compare the re-
sults of the regression for long-term loans with those for short-term loans.
Then, both Tobin’s q and ICR have a significantly negative correlation with
MAINLOAN for the short-term loan, whereas neither of them has any clear
relationships with MAINLOAN for the long-term loan. Furthermore, in con-
10In our sample, there are 122 firms that take out long-term loans from some banks but
do not borrow any long-term loans from their main banks, while there are only 36 firms
that borrow short-term loans from some banks but do not borrow any short-term loans
from their main banks.
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trast to the results for the short-term loan, the estimated coefficients of
DEBT and CAR are significantly positive for the long-term loan. These
findings suggest that the role of the main bank as a short-term lender is
rather different from that as a long-term lender.
4.3 Firm’s choice of underwriters
In this subsection, we again use the sample selection and double hurdle mod-
els represented by (1) and (2). Here, yi is the probability of the main bank-
owned securities subsidiary being a lead underwriter for the issue of straight
bonds (MAINBOND) or the probability of other bank-owned securities sub-
sidiaries being a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds (OTHER-
BOND); and Ii is a variable that takes a value of one if the firm issues
straight bonds in fiscal year 1998, and takes zero otherwise. The vector xi in
(1) consists of one, Tobin’s q, BONDRATE, ICR, SIZE, DEBT, CAR, the
noncommercial bank dummy variable, and the trust bank dummy variable.
The vector zi in (2) is made up of one, Tobin’s q, ICR, and the industrial
dummy variables.
The estimated results for MAINBOND are presented in Table 5. In the
sample selection, most of the estimated coefficients based on the sample se-
lection model are insignificant. On the other hand, in the double hurdle
model, although the estimated coefficients on Tobin’s q are positive but not
necessarily significant, the corresponding estimates on ICR are significantly
positive. In the regression, most of the estimated coefficients based on the
sample selection model are still insignificant, while the estimated coefficients
of ICR and DEBT based on the double hurdle model are highly significant.
Such differences arise from the existence of firms that issue straight bonds
but do not choose the main bank-owned securities subsidiary as a lead un-
derwriter.
In this subsection, BONDRATE and ICR are used as a proxy for the
likelihood of financial distress. In fact, it follows from the results that no
estimated coefficients of BONDRATE are significant, while the estimated
coefficients of ICR are significantly positive. One possible explanation for the
results is that the interest coverage ratio is more important than the long-
term bond ratings in determining the probability of the main bank-owned
securities subsidiary being a lead underwriter.
Table 6 reports the results for OTHERBOND. In contrast to the results
obtained in the sample selection part of MAINBOND, the estimated coef-
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ficients of Tobin’s q are significantly positive in the double hurdle model.
However, the corresponding estimates of ICR are significantly positive only
in the double hurdle model with dropping long-term bond ratings instead of
adding ICR and the trust bank dummy variable in the regression part.11
In the regression, we focus on the estimated results based on the double
hurdle model that includes ICR as an explanatory variable, and compare the
results of OTHERBOND with those of MAINBOND. Then, we see that the
estimated coefficients of ICR and DEBT are insignificant in OTHERBOND
although they are significantly positive in MAINBOND. Furthermore, the
estimated coefficients of SIZE and CAR are significantly positive in OTH-
ERBOND, while they are insignificant in MAINBOND.
We now discuss the plausibility of the hypotheses about the firm’s choice
of underwriters by inspecting the estimated coefficients of Tobin’s q and
ICR in the regression part of the double hurdle model in Tables 5 and 6.
Our results imply that firms with a smaller likelihood of financial distress
are more likely to use their main bank-owned securities subsidiaries as a
lead underwriter rather than other bank-owned securities subsidiaries. Our
results are therefore consistent with the implications of the hypothesis of
the conflict of interest effect between main banks and other investors, but
are inconsistent with those of the certification effect and liquidity constraint
hypotheses.
We should add several comments on the interpretation of other estimates
in the regression section of the double hurdle model in Tables 5 and 6. The re-
sult that the estimated coefficients of DEBT are significantly positive only in
MAINBOND is consistent with our conjecture that firms with larger DEBT
are more likely to depend on their main banks. The variable SIZE has a posi-
tive effect only in OTHERBOND. This is because firm-specific information on
large-sized firms is more useful to other bank-owned securities subsidiaries
that are less informed than main bank-owned securities subsidiaries. The
variable CAR also has a positive effect only in OTHERBOND. If a bank’s
capital is adequate (CAR is larger), the bank can keep a business relationship
with its customers by making loans, not by having its subsidiary underwrite
the customers’ bonds. Furthermore, other bank-owned securities subsidiaries
11In Table 6, we exclude the trust bank dummy variable from the explanatory variables in
the double hurdle model that includes long-term bond ratings as an explanatory variable.
When we include the trust bank dummy variable as an explanatory variable in this case,
we cannot obtain the estimated coefficients. The reason is that the estimated variance
matrix is singular.
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are then more likely to be induced to underwrite bonds issued by firms with
larger CAR. This is because the main bank and its subsidiary are less likely
to misuse their customers’ private information for their self-interest.
4.4 Shareholdings
All of our sampling firms issue stocks because they are listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange first and second sections. Hence, it is not necessary to use ei-
ther the sample selection model nor the double hurdle model to avoid the sam-
ple selection bias. Instead, in this subsection, the independent variable–the
stockholding ratio by the main bank (MAINSTOCK) or the stockholding ratio
by the other financial intermediaries except for the main bank (FINSTOCK)–
is regressed on the explanatory variables consisting of Tobin’s q, ICR, SIZE,
DEBT, CAR, the noncommercial bank dummy variable, the trust bank
dummy variable, and the industrial dummy variables.
The results fromOLS estimations of MAINSTOCK are presented in Table
7, which indicates that the estimated coefficients of Tobin’s q, SIZE, and the
noncommercial bank and trust bank dummy variables are significant. In
addition, we give Logit estimation results. All the estimated coefficients of
the explanatory variables are significant, but their signs are totally opposite
to those of the OLS estimations.
One possible explanation of why the estimated results depend strongly on
the estimation methods arises from the regulations governing shareholdings
owned by financial intermediaries. The anti-trust law stipulates that share-
holdings by financial intermediaries are restricted to 5% of the outstanding
shares of each domestic firm. As a result, in many cases the main bank has
to make do with holding the outstanding shares at most up to 5%. Thus,
the data of MAINSTOCK suffers from such a distributive bias.
Given this bias, we define the following variable:
pi ≡ 1.00−MAINSTOCK (9)
Combined with the definition of MAINSTOCK, equation (9) implies that
pi = 0 if the main bank holds 5% outstanding shares, while pi = 1 if the
main bank holds no outstanding shares. We replace MAINSTOCK with pi
as an independent variable and estimate the regression equation using OLS,
Logit, and Tobit. This procedure deals with pi = 0 as a censored observation
and will provide consistent estimators.
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Table 8 presents the results using pi as an independent variable. The
results based on the three methods are qualitatively similar except for the
estimates of the coefficient of the trust bank dummy variable. These results
imply that main banks hold more shares of firms with a smaller prospect of
growth and a larger scale.
The results from both OLS and Logit estimations of FINSTOCK are
reported in Table 9. As shown in Table 8, the results based on OLS and
Logit are qualitatively similar: in both regressions, the estimated coefficients
of Tobin’s q and SIZE are significantly positive, whereas those of DEBT are
significantly negative. These results suggest that shareholdings by the other
financial intermediaries increase with the growth prospects of the firm and the
size of the firm, but decrease with an increase in the debt-asset ratio. In the
preceding subsection, we showed that the probability of other bank-owned
securities subsidiaries being a lead underwriter increases with CAR. Since
main bank (other bank) loans and main bank (other bank) shareholdings
are complements, while main bank (other bank) loans and main bank (other
bank) subsidiary bond underwritings are substitutes, the expected estimate
of CAR would be negative. In fact, the estimation results of CAR in Table 9
are not sufficiently strong because they depend on the estimation methods.
Thus, we cannot give any unambiguous interpretations of these results.12
Comparing the results in Table 8 with those in Table 9, we see that main
banks hold more shares of firms with smaller prospects for growth and a
larger dependence on debt than do the other financial intermediaries. This
finding implies that the liquidity constraint hypothesis can explain why main
banks hold equities of non-financial firms.
4.5 Discussion
Our empirical results are now summarized as follows:
(i) For bank versus bond financing, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin’s q
12Some readers might wonder if the estimates of SIZE in Tables 3, 4, and 8 would not
imply the complementary relation between main bank loans and main bank sharehold-
ings. In fact, small firms are more likely to have a concentrated ownership structure of
shareholdings than large firms. Hence, small firms may have less incentive to depend on
cross-shareholdings with their main banks than large firms. Readers might also wonder if
the estimates of DEBT in Tables 3 and 9 would be inconsistent because the ratio of the
other banks’ loans to total loans decreases with an increase in the main bank loan ratio.
This question will be discussed in the next subsection by considering the interpretation of
the estimates of DEBT in Table 3.
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and lower interest coverage ratios depend significantly more on bank loans.
(ii) In relation to the role of main banks in bank loans, Japanese firms with
a smaller Tobin’s q, lower interest coverage ratios, smaller size, lower debt-
asset ratios, and lower capital adequacy ratios of their main banks, depend
significantly more on short-term bank loans provided by main banks. On the
other hand, Japanese firms with a smaller size, higher debt-asset ratios, and
higher capital adequacy ratios of their main banks depend significantly more
on long-term bank loans provided by main banks.
(iii) In relation to the firm’s choice of underwriters, Japanese firms with
higher interest coverage and higher debt-asset ratios are more likely to use
their main bank-owned securities subsidiaries rather than other bank-owned
securities subsidiaries as a lead underwriter for bond underwriting.
(iv) In relation to cross-shareholdings, Japanese firms with a smaller Tobin’s
q and larger size have significantly more shares held by main banks, whereas
Japanese firms with a larger Tobin’s q, larger size, and lower debt-asset ratios
have significantly more shares held by other financial intermediaries.
Results (i) and (ii) show that banks lend more to firms with smaller
prospects for growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress; in particu-
lar, main banks make more short-term loans to those firms. These results re-
veal that main banks are forced to make additional loans in order to support
financially distressed firms with lower growth potential. Our findings also
support the hold-up or the liquidity constraint hypothesis, thereby provid-
ing some evidence that firms with smaller prospects for growth and a greater
likelihood of financial distress tend to borrow from banks (as reported in Shi-
rasu and Xu (2000)). In contrast to the arguments of Anderson and Makhija
(1999), our results do not support the agency cost hypothesis that firms with
a greater prospect of growth are more likely to borrow from banks. The
reason is that they use the data of Japanese firms for the late 1980s when
the bond issuance criteria had not been drastically loosened. The difference
between the two results reflects the current trend that the deregulation of
the public bond market enabled Japanese firms to utilize arm’s-length public
debt, which has caused Japanese banks to lose valued customers.
Although firms with a smaller prospect of growth and a greater like-
lihood of financial distress depend heavily on short-term loans from their
main banks, it may be premature to interpret these results as evidence of the
reckless behavior of main banks, because lending money to such customers is
one of the main bank’s functions as the lender of last resort to non-financial
companies. This argument can be justified only if the main banks provide
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funds to such non-financial firms, taking larger risks in anticipation of higher
expected returns. However, result (ii) suggests that the main bank short-term
loan ratio decreases with an increase in the debt-asset ratio of the customer
firm, whereas the main bank long-term loan ratio increases with the debt-
asset ratio of the customer firm. Since Diamond (1991b, 1993) shows that
short-term loans are a more useful tool for the banks to discipline borrowers
than long-term loans, this finding provides some evidence that main banks
have been forced to abandon some of their disciplinary measures against firms
with higher debt-asset ratios. Furthermore, result (ii) also indicates that the
main bank short-term loan ratio decreases with an increase in the capital
adequacy ratio of the main bank, although the main bank long-term loan
ratio does not. As already discussed in subsection 3.2, the higher main bank
loan ratio associated with the lower capital adequacy ratio of the main bank
can be interpreted as indicating that the main banks fail in the liquidation of
inefficient firms and grant them many bad loans. These findings thus imply
that main banks are forced to generously assist inefficient customer firms to
survive, thereby causing the soft budgeting problem.
Results (i) and (iii) suggest that firms with a greater prospect of growth
and a lesser likelihood of financial distress issue straight bonds. In particular,
main bank-owned securities subsidiaries are more likely to underwrite less fi-
nancially distressed firms than other bank-owned securities subsidiaries. This
result is consistent with the conflict of interest effect hypothesis that main
banks misuse their private information for their self-interest at the expense of
the other banks. Hamao and Hoshi (2000) report that there are no significant
differences not only between the characteristics of straight corporate bonds
underwritten by existing securities firms and bank-owned subsidiary secu-
rities firms, but also between those underwritten by bank-owned subsidiary
securities firms and main bank-owned subsidiary securities firms. Hamao and
Hoshi’s results may arise from their estimation procedure, which neglects the
sample selection bias for underwriters, making their estimates inconsistent.
Result (iv) indicates that main banks hold more shares of firms with
smaller prospects of growth than the other financial intermediaries: the
greater stockholdings by main banks resolve the liquidity constraint prob-
lem of the firms with smaller growth prospects to which main banks lend.
Combined with result (ii), this finding may support the liquidity constraint
hypothesis that firms belonging to declining industries or firms with less
growth opportunities are more likely to have close financial relationships
with main banks in order to avoid the liquidity problem. Flath (1993), using
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1980s data, shows that main banks are likely to hold stocks of firms with
greater growth prospects and a greater likelihood of financial distress. How-
ever, his data set is not appropriate for the study of the corporate governance
of Japanese firms in the 1990s. Our empirical results suggest that in the late
1990s main banks are more likely to hold stocks of firms with less prospects
for growth and a greater likelihood of financial distress than are the other
financial intermediaries. In other words, main banks need to liquidate un-
realized capital gains from their holding stocks of firms with greater growth
prospects or less likelihood of financial distress in order to write off their huge
bad loans.
Results (ii) and (iii) strongly indicate that the main bank system is con-
strained with respect to its lending behavior. Furthermore, result (iv) implies
the negative view of the main bank system with respect to shareholdings.
This interpretation is particularly true because main banks misuse their pri-
vate information for their own self-interest at the expense of the other banks
in bond underwriting, as main banks are forced to make additional loans
to firms that have smaller prospects for growth and a greater likelihood of
financial distress. Before the burst of the bubble economy, the main bank
system was regarded as one of the key elements behind the rapid economic
growth of Japan. However, our results suggest that the main bank system
prevented the Japanese economy from recovering during the late 1990s. The
main banks have now become a life-support system for inefficient, insolvent
firms, by providing such firms with loans for the continuation of their in-
efficient business. This seems to suggest that most major Japanese banks
cannot decrease their bad loans by themselves. To overcome this problem,
the authorities may need to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks
and attempt to organize a new banking system that promotes bank lending
to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater likelihood of financial
distress.13
13Our results explain why the large bad loans have not vanished even though the gov-
ernment injected public funds into the large Japanese banks in March 1998 and March
1999, and encouraged them to write off their bad loans. With regard to the theoretical
foundation for the nationalization of financially distressed banks, see Osano (2002).
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5 Conclusion
We considered how firm-specific factors affected the choice of the financing
pattern of Japanese firms for the period in which deregulation and reform of
the financing decision of firms were almost completed and Japanese banks
incurred huge bad loans. Our main empirical results suggest that: (i) main
banks make more short-term loans to firms with smaller prospects of growth
and a greater likelihood of financial distress; (ii) main banks misuse their
private information for their self-interest at the expense of the other banks
in bond underwriting; and (iii) main banks hold more shares of firms with
smaller prospects for growth. These findings indicate that the role of the main
banks as a lender to firms with greater prospects for growth but a greater
likelihood of financial distress is constrained. To overcome this problem, the
authorities may need to nationalize most of the major Japanese banks and
attempt to organize a new banking system that promotes bank lending to
firms with a greater prospect of growth but a greater likelihood of financial
distress.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Average Std. dev. Maximum Minimum
MAINLAON (short-
term)
0.2325 0.2058 1.0000 0.0000
MAINLOAN (long-
term)
0.1750 0.2134 1.0000 0.0000
MAINBOND 0.0292 0.1373 1.0000 0.0000
OTHERBOND 0.0146 0.0907 1.0000 0.0000
MAINSTOCK 0.7380 0.3360 1.0000 0.0000
FINSTOCK 0.2727 0.1498 0.6600 0.0000
Tobin’s q 0.9329 0.3979 4.1850 0.0138
ICR 0.8896 0.2390 1.0000 0.0000
SIZE 4.7288 0.5645 6.8904 3.1452
DEBT 0.5341 0.2005 0.9937 0.0593
CAR 1.3325 1.0879 6.5600 0.0000
Notes:
• MAINLOAN is the main bank loan ratio defined as (amount of loans from the main
bank) / (total amount of loans from financial institutions).
• MAINBOND is the probability of the main bank-owned securities subsidiary being
a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds defined as (frequency that the
main bank-owned securities subsidiary becomes a lead underwriter in fiscal year
1998) / (frequency of the issue of straight bonds in fiscal year 1998).
• OTHERBOND is the probability of other bank-owned securities subsidiaries being
a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds defined as (frequency that other
bank-owned securities subsidiaries become a lead underwriter in fiscal year 1998) /
(frequency of the issue of straight bonds in fiscal year 1998).
• MAINSTOCK is the stockholding ratio by the main bank defined as ((number of
stocks that the main bank holds) / (total number of stocks))×20.
• FINSTOCK is the stockholding ratio by the other financial intermediaries except for
the main bank defined as (number of stocks that the other financial intermediaries
except for the main bank hold) / (total number of stocks).
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• ICR is the interest coverage ratio.
• SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales.
• DEBT is the debt-asset ratio defined as (total amount of debt) / (total amount of
assets).
• CAR is the capital adequacy ratio of the main bank.
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Table 2: Bank versus bond financing
Bank loan Bond issue
Constant 6.6668 -0.9931
(288719.67) ( 0.7884)















2 + ε2i .
Here, I1i takes a value of one if the firm borrows newly from banks, and takes
zero otherwise; I2i takes a value of one if the firm issues straight bonds, and zero
otherwise; zi consists of one, Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), and the indus-
trial dummy variables; and ε1i and ε
2
i are error terms that have a bivariate normal
distribution with mean 0, var(ε1i ) = σ
2




i ) = ρεσ
2.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• ρε in the table is the estimated correlation coefficient between ε1i and ε2i .
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Main bank loan ratio (short-term)
Estimation process Sample selection part
Estimation method Sample selection Double hurdle
Constant 2.7516*** 2.4950*** 2.7514*** 2.5982***
(0.2494) (0.2531) (0.2494) (0.2515)
Tobin’s q -0.7150*** -0.6593*** -0.7156*** -0.6815***
(0.1277) (0.1232) (0.1276) (0.1255)
ICR -1.4726*** -1.2945*** -1.4718*** -1.3677***
(0.2194) (0.2265) (0.2194) (0.2237)
Trust bank dummy 0.9022* 0.7327 0.9003* 0.8343*
(0.4839) (0.4677) (0.4834) (0.4491)
Estimation process Regression part
Constant 0.8376*** 0.8250*** 0.8393*** 0.8594***
(0.0721) (0.0753) (0.0740) (0.0761)




SIZE -0.0887*** -0.0710*** -0.0900*** -0.0794***
(0.0147) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0142)
DEBT -0.1489*** -0.1147*** -0.1431*** -0.1214***
(0.0392) (0.0400) (0.0414) (0.0427)
CAR -0.0131* -0.0129* -0.0136* -0.0131*
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0076)
Noncommercial
bank dummy
0.0035 -0.0016 0.0019 -0.0007
(0.0221) (0.0212) (0.0232) (0.0228)
ρ -0.1801 0.0397 -0.2043 0.7882
Notes:
• The sample selection section corresponds to equation (2): I∗i= z0iγ + vi. The
regression section corresponds to equation (1): y∗i= x
0
iβ + ui. In the sample se-
lection section, I∗i =1 if the non-zero value is described in the item of short-term
loans payable on the balance sheet, and I∗i =0 otherwise; and zi consists of one,
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Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), and the trust bank dummy variable. In
the regression section, yi is the main bank loan ratio (MAINLOAN) for short-term
loans; and xi consists of one, Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (natural
logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of the
main bank), and the noncommercial bank dummy variable. The error terms ui and
vi have a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, var(ui) = σ
2, var(vi) = 1,
and cov(ui, vi) = ρσ
2
.
• ρ in the table is the estimated correlation coefficient between ui and vi.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4: Main bank loan ratio (long-term)
Estimation process Sample selection part
Estimation method Sample selection Double hurdle
Constant 2.5364*** 1.5507*** 2.5320*** 2.5236***
(0.2076) (0.2902) (0.2079) (0.2083)
Tobin’s q -0.5368*** -0.3902** -0.5372*** -0.5357***
(0.1246) (0.1534) (0.1248) (0.1248)
ICR -1.4743*** -0.7604*** -1.4695*** -1.4629***
(0.1944) (0.2759) (0.1947) (0.1953)
Trust bank dummy 0.3540 -0.4598 0.3683 0.3971
(0.3912) (0.7989) (0.3882) (0.3866)
Estimation process Regression part
Constant 0.7976*** 0.4010*** 0.7784*** 0.7748***
(0.0849) (0.1456) (0.1014) (0.1276)




SIZE -0.1296*** -0.0004 -0.1430*** -0.1449***
(0.0178) (0.0270) (0.0208) (0.0212)
DEBT 0.0289 0.0026 0.1151** 0.1216**
(0.0422) (0.0613) (0.0540) (0.0542)
CAR 0.0184** -0.0001 0.0213** 0.0211**
(0.0084) (0.0142) (0.0106) (0.0106)
Noncommercial
bank dummy
0.0354 -0.0025 0.0451 0.0462
(0.0279) (0.0417) (0.0339) (0.0339)
ρ 1.0000 1.0000 -0.0366 -0.0964
Notes:
• The sample selection section corresponds to equation (2): I∗i= z0iγ + vi. The
regression section corresponds to equation (1): y∗i= x
0
iβ + ui. In the sample se-
lection section, I∗i =1 if the non-zero value is described in the item of long-term
loans payable on the balance sheet, and I∗i =0 otherwise; and zi consists of one,
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Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), and the trust bank dummy variable. In
the regression section, yi is the main bank loan ratio (MAINLOAN) for long-term
loans; and xi consists of one, Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (natural
logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of the
main bank), and the noncommercial bank dummy variable. The error terms ui and
vi have a bivariate normal distribution with mean 0, var(ui) = σ
2, var(vi) = 1,
and cov(ui, vi) = ρσ
2
.
• ρ in the table is the estimated correlation coefficient between ui and vi.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Probability of the main bank-owned securities subsidiary being a lead underwriter
Estimation process Sample selection part
Estimation method Sample selection Double hurdle
Constant -2.6285 -3.0964*** -2.3062** -2.9944**
(2.9831) (0.5982) (1.0281) (1.3385)
Tobin’s q 0.2811 0.3392* 0.3365* 0.2951
(0.2709) (0.1863) (0.1864) (0.1936)
ICR 0.6746 0.9325 0.8875* 1.6306***
(0.8138) (0.5747) (0.4723) (0.5604)
Estimation process Regression part
Constant -1.3324** -1.6619*** -3.8633** -3.9596**
(0.5463) (0.4219) (1.6308) (1.6108)
Tobin’s q 0.2302 0.0531 0.1788 0.1022









SIZE 0.0098 0.0862 0.1755 0.1140
(0.0960) (0.0609) (0.2075) (0.1824)
DEBT 0.4862* 0.3430 2.0841*** 1.6672***
(0.2830) (0.2317) (0.7841) (0.6435)
CAR 0.0427 0.0105 0.0272 -0.0199
(0.0329) (0.0354) (0.1140) (0.1181)
Noncommercial
bank dummy
-0.0236 0.0637 0.1144 0.0996
0.1213 (0.0745) (0.2380) (0.2060)
Trust bank dummy 0.4310 0.4595 1.1088 0.9208
(0.5723) (0.6725) (1.1604) (0.8731)
ρ 1.0000 0.9919 1.0000 0.9998
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Notes:
• The sample selection section corresponds to equation (2): I∗i= z0iγ + vi. The
regression section corresponds to equation (1): y∗i= x
0
iβ + ui. In the sample se-
lection section, I∗i =1 if the firm issues straight bonds, and I
∗
i =0 otherwise; and zi
consists of one, Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), and the industrial dummy
variables. In the regression section, yi is the probability of the main bank-owned
securities subsidiary being a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds (MAIN-
BOND); and xi consists of one, Tobin’s q, the credit rating dummy variables (AA,
A, BBB) based on the highest rating among the long-term bond ratings provided by
R&I, JCR, S&P, and Moody’s Japan, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (natural
logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of the
main bank), the noncommercial bank dummy variable, and the trust bank dummy
variable. The error terms ui and vi have a bivariate normal distribution with mean
0, var(ui) = σ
2, var(vi) = 1, and cov(ui, vi) = ρσ
2
.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• ρ in the table is the estimated correlation coefficient between ui and vi.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Probability of other bank-owned securities subsidiaries being a lead underwriter
Estimation process Sample selection part
Estimation method Sample selection Double hurdle
Constant -2.1254*** -2.0171* -2.2474*** -2.5514***
(0.4293) (1.0566) (0.5284) (0.4140)
Tobin’s q 0.3570 0.1377 0.4272** 0.3189*
(0.2500) (0.2369) (0.1917) (0.1800)
ICR 0.9606 0.9730 1.1678 1.4041***
(0.7648) (0.5974) (0.8053) (0.5145)
Estimation process Regression part
Constant 0.7610 -0.9187*** 2.1288 -5.6246**
(0.5638) (0.3396) (1.4362) (2.6539)
Tobin’s q -0.1092 0.0435 -0.5827 0.1305









SIZE 0.1165 0.0169 0.1816 0.2985*
(0.0985) (0.0519) (0.2403) (0.1755)
DEBT -0.1961 -0.0262 -0.5770 1.0304
(0.3590) (0.1574) (0.8156) (0.7492)
CAR 0.0225 0.0077 0.0378 0.1877*
(0.0753) (0.0215) (0.1780) (0.1114)
Noncommercial
bank dummy
-0.0776 0.0055 0.2540 -0.1498
(0.1625) (0.0760) (0.3586) (0.2921)
Trust bank dummy -0.4431 -0.0622 -1.6935
(1.1595) (0.3091) (261.8513)
ρ 1.0000 1.0000 -1.0000 0.9861
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Notes:
• The sample selection section corresponds to equation (2): I∗i= z0iγ + vi. The
regression section corresponds to equation (1): y∗i= x
0
iβ + ui. In the sample se-
lection section, I∗i =1 if the firm issues straight bonds, and I
∗
i =0 otherwise; and zi
consists of one, Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), and the industrial dummy
variables. In the regression section, yi is the probability of other bank-owned secu-
rities subsidiaries being a lead underwriter for the issue of straight bonds (OTHER-
BOND); and xi consists of one, Tobin’s q, the credit rating dummy variables (AA,
A, BBB) based on the highest rating among the long-term bond ratings provided by
R&I, JCR, S&P, and Moody’s Japan, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (natural
logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of the
main bank), the noncommercial bank dummy variable, and the trust bank dummy
variable. The error terms ui and vi have a bivariate normal distribution with mean
0, var(ui) = σ
2, var(vi) = 1, and cov(ui, vi) = ρσ
2
.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• ρ in the table is the estimated correlation coefficient between ui and vi.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Main bank shareholding ratio (1)
Estimation method OLS Logit
Constant 0.4677** -0.3261
(0.2236) (0.7445)










Noncommercial bank dummy 0.2561*** -4.0588***
(0.0609) (0.2026)





• The OLS section presents results from OLS regressions based on the following equa-
tion:
MAINSTOCK = α0 + α1Tobin’s q + α2ICR + α3SIZE + α4DEBT + α5CAR
+ α6(Noncommercial bank dummy) + α7(Trust bank dummy) + α8(Industrial
dummy).
The dependent variable is MAINSTOCK ((stockholding ratio by the main bank)×20).
The independent variables are Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (nat-
ural logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of
the main bank), the noncommercial bank dummy variable, the trust bank dummy
variable, and the industry dummy variables. The LOGIT section presents results
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from logit regressions based on an equation which is identical to that used in the
OLS section. The dependent variable is a dummy variable assigned the value of
one if the firm’s stock is held by the firm’s main bank.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Main bank shareholding ratio (2)
Estimation method OLS Logit Tobit
Constant 0.5323** 0.3706 0.4868
(0.2236) (1.7039) (0.3977)
Tobin’s q 0.1078*** 0.5618*** 0.1909***
(0.0291) (0.2036) (0.0511)
ICR 0.0503 0.2785 0.1505
(0.0527) (0.3836) (0.0993)
SIZE -0.0861*** -0.4631*** -0.1245***
(0.0215) (0.1573) (0.0390)
DEBT -0.0018 0.0127 -0.0154
(0.0617) (0.4423) (0.1137)
CAR 0.0208 0.1108 0.0351
(0.0128) (0.0899) (0.0235)
Noncommercial bank dummy -0.2561*** -1.3458*** -0.3315***
(0.0609) (0.4591) (0.1095)





• The OLS section presents results from OLS regressions based on the following equa-
tion:
pi =α0 +α1Tobin’s q +α2ICR +α3SIZE +α4DEBT+α5CAR+α6(Noncommercial
bank dummy) + α7(Trust bank dummy) + α8(Industrial dummy).
The dependent variable is pi ≡ 1.00 − MAINSTOCK ((stockholding ratio by the
main bank)×20). The independent variables are Tobin’s q, ICR (interest coverage
ratio), SIZE (natural logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-asset ratio), CAR (capital
adequacy ratio of the main bank), the noncommercial bank dummy variable, the
trust bank dummy variable, and the industrial dummy variables. The LOGIT sec-
tion presents results from logit regressions based on an equation which is identical
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to that used in the OLS section. The TOBIT section provides results from tobit
regressions based on the equation which is identical to that used in the OLS part.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Shareholding ratio of the other financial intermediaries
Estimation method OLS Logit
Constant -0.5363*** -4.9047***
(0.0805) (0.5309)










Noncommercial bank dummy -0.0290 0.2755*
(0.0219) (0.1442)





• The OLS section presents results from OLS regressions based on the following equa-
tion:
FINSTOCK = α0 + α1Tobin’s q + α2ICR + α3SIZE + α4DEBT + α5CAR
+ α6(Noncommercial bank dummy) + α7(Trust bank dummy) + α8(Industrial
dummy).
The dependent variable is FINSTOCK (stockholding ratio by the other financial
intermediaries except for the main bank). The independent variables are Tobin’s
q, ICR (interest coverage ratio), SIZE (natural logarithm of sales), DEBT (debt-
asset ratio), CAR (capital adequacy ratio of the main bank), the noncommercial
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bank dummy variable, the trust bank dummy variable, and the industrial dummy
variables. The LOGIT section presents results from logit regressions based on an
equation which is identical to that used in the OLS section. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable assigned the value of one if the firm’s stock is held by the other
financial intermediaries except for the firm’s main bank.
• The estimated coefficients of the industrial dummy variables are omitted.
• The figures in ( ) indicate standard errors.
• *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels, respectively.
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